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Abstract—Alongside technological tools to support wellbeing
and treatment of mental disorders, models of these disorders
can also be invaluable tools to understand, support and im-
prove these conditions. Robots can provide ecologically valid
models that take into account embodiment-, interaction-, and
context-related elements. Focusing on Obsessive-Compulsive
spectrum disorders, in this paper we discuss some of the
potential contributions of robot models and relate them to
other models used in psychology and psychiatry, particularly
animal models. We also present some initial recommenda-
tions for their meaningful design and rigorous use.
1. Introduction
Alongside technological tools to support wellbeing
and treatment of mental disorders, models of these disor-
ders (e.g., their underlying cognitive and affective mech-
anisms, etiology and symptoms) can also be invaluable
tools to understand, support and improve these conditions.
The new field of computational psychiatry [1] has started
producing computer-based simulated models of some con-
ditions. Complementing and going beyond these models,
robots can provide more ecologically valid models that
also take into account embodiment-, interaction-, and
context-related elements. We argue that robot models of
mental disorders have significant potential as a research
tool to complement existing models and techniques. As
we will see, their contributions can be at many levels:
for example, they can help refine conceptual models and
their implementations in animal models; they can improve
our understanding of theoretical models and how they
might complement each other by operationalizing them
in ways that permit precise application and comparison of
models; and they permit carrying out of studies that are
not possible using other models for either methodological
or ethical reasons.
In this paper, we outline the different types of models
of mental disorders, both theoretical and concrete (partic-
ularly animal) models with a special focus on Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder (OCD). We also summarize their
conditions of validity, main strengths and limitations, and
discuss how robot models can build on and complement
them, to make contributions to translational research. As
work towards this goal, we propose an initial set of
recommendations for the implementation of robot models,
and an iterative design process based on a process from
the animal model literature.
2. Models of Mental Disorders and OCD
In our research on robot models of mental disorders,
we are currently focusing on Obsessive-Compulsive Dis-
order (OCD), and we will first provide a brief charac-
terization of this condition as background to understand
the discussion in this paper. Care must be taken with the
word “model”, as it can have different meanings in dif-
ferent scientific disciplines [2], and the rest if this section
aims to clarify these different meanings. We distinguish
two categories of model: conceptual (theoretical) models,
and concrete implementations such as animal models and
computational models.
2.1. Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is a disabling
mental health disorder characterized by obsessions (re-
current, invasive, often unpleasant thoughts) and/or com-
pulsions (a strong urge to carry out certain repetitive or
ritualized behaviors, such as hand washing or excessive
checking). OCD is considered as part of the obsessive-
compulsive (OC) spectrum, which also includes condi-
tions such as trichotillomania (pathological hair pulling),
body dismorphic disorder (BDD), and tic disorders such
as Tourette’s syndrome. In line with this, the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed. (DSM-
V, 2013) introduced a category of Obsessive-Compulsive
and Related Disorders (OCRD) which includes a number
of these spectrum conditions.
The main treatments of OCD are psychological
interventions—such as exposure and response prevention
(ERP)—and medication—usually SSRIs (selective sero-
tonin reuptake inhibitors which, as the name suggests,
reduce the rate of reabsorption of the neurotransmitter
serotonin). However, these existing treatments fail to help
a significant portion of patients [3].
The superficially related condition of obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder (OCPD) is characterized
by excessive perfectionism, and desire for “orderliness”
(e.g., a needless desire for symmetry) and control. The
main difference between OCD and OCPD is that OCPD is
part of the person’s personality and therefore perceived by
them as normal, rather than unwanted. However, whether
OCPD should be considered within the OC spectrum is
an open question [4].
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2.2. Conceptual models
By a “conceptual model of a mental disorder” we
mean a theoretical construct that links underlying causes
(etiology), either proposed or observed, with observed
symptoms and correlates. A conceptual model should
serve as a framework for understanding, and should have
explanatory and predictive power with respect to the con-
dition being modeled. Conceptual models may be based
on psychological, neuroscientific or other frameworks
for understanding cognition and behavior. A conceptual
model may include currently theorized elements of the
mental disorder that elaborate a hypothesized mechanism.
The related term “causal model” is widely used and may
be considered as meaning a conceptual model that de-
scribes causal relations between the elements of a system.
In practice, many conceptual models are therefore causal
models.
As examples of conceptual models we can mention
the five cognitive-behavioral models for OCD discussed
by Shafran [5]. These variously propose as the key mech-
anism: (i) a faulty appraisal of normal intrusive thoughts
due to an inflated sense of responsibility, (ii) an inflated
appraisal of the significance of normal intrusive thoughts,
(iii) an excessive emphasis on control of one’s own
thoughts, (iv) faulty evaluation of the likelihood and con-
sequences of danger, (v) a self-perpetuating mechanism
in which checking behavior fails to provide satisfactory
certainty, but increases sense of responsibility and thereby
elevates the probability of harm.
It is important to note that there is not one “true”
model that we are seeking; different models may be
compatible with each other, but have different emphases or
different levels of abstraction, and it would be beneficial
to understand their complementarities. It may also be that
a mental health condition currently viewed as a single
entity has multiple mechanisms or causes and is therefore
better viewed as multiple conditions, each with different
models. We claim that robot models can contribute to this
with a synthetic approach that complements and supports
analysis.
2.3. Concrete models
2.3.1. Animal models. Van der Staay gives the following
definition of an animal model [6]:
“An animal model with biological and/or clini-
cal relevance in the behavioral neurosciences is
a living organism used to study brain–behavior
relations under controlled conditions, with the
final goal to gain insight into, and to enable pre-
dictions about, these relations in humans and/or
a species other than the one studied, or in the
same species under conditions different from
those under which the study was performed.”
Animal models may be induced by genetic techniques
(e.g., gene knockout in experimental animals), by the
use of drugs to induce symptoms similar to those of
the disease, or by environmental manipulation (e.g., by
introducing particular stressors or by using behaviorist ap-
proaches). Alternatively, they may be naturally occurring.
As we shall see in section 3.2, an animal model will often
have an underlying conceptual model associated with it.
Animal models have the advantages that they model
complete systems (organism and environment), and they
use a real animal, hence a real nervous system. However,
there are limits to how closely a non-human animal can
be used to model human mental disorders. In addition,
symptoms that can be inferred from animal models are
largely those based on observation of behavior, with the
internal experience that is important in descriptions of
human mental disorders either inferred from behavior
or from neurological examination of the animal (see
section 3.4). Another important disadvantage of animal
models is the ethical issues associated with animal ex-
perimentation. These issues become more problematic as
the model animal is evolutionarily closer to humans—
experimentation on, and housing of, primates is more
ethically problematic than on mice.
2.3.2. Computational Models. Computational models
are realizations, or partial realizations, of theoretical mod-
els in computers. The emerging field of computational
psychiatry includes within its scope the development of
computational models of psychiatric disorders [1].
With respect to animal models, these models have the
advantage that, by their nature, they are highly specified
and so any results should be replicable (or, preferably,
reproducible [7]). Also, unlike animal models, the whole
(modeled) system can be analyzed in detail, with the
possibility that some internal processes can be related to
human internal experience. However, due to the complex-
ity of implementing such a model, for practical reasons
they are typically only partial implementations (e.g., of
a neurological subsystem) or they work at a relatively
high level of abstraction (e.g., with brain areas, rather than
individual neurons). In addition, they do not necessarily
include any behavioral element, a true closed-loop (phys-
ical and social) interaction with the environment, or the
effects of contextual and environmental elements.
2.3.3. Robot Models. Robot models of mental disorders,
like computational models, include an embedded realiza-
tion of a conceptual model. However, in this case the
model is implemented in an embodied, interacting robot
and its environment, which introduce new elements that
purely computational models lack.
Embodiment is an important aspect of many mental
disorders (e.g., distorted perception of the body, distorted
perception of body ownership), as well as of some ther-
apeutic approaches (e.g., exercise, art therapy). The em-
bodied element of cognitive-affective autonomous robots
permits a realistic and ecologically valid modeling of such
phenomena, and the potential use of robots in “embod-
ied” therapeutic practices. Embodied robot models can
naturally take account of the fact that action modifies
perception1, both of the environment and of the own body,
and this in turn affects action and the perception-action
loop (which includes cognition at different levels). We
argue that a more systematic understanding of dysfunc-
tions in the perception-action loop might be key towards
understanding mental disorders.
1. In some versions of the sensorimotor approach to cognition such
as [8], action is a necessary component to account for the quality of
sensory experience.
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In addition, robots are situated in a physical (and
often social) environment that can be very similar to
a human environment in ways that are relevant to the
study of cognition and their dysfunctions under specific
circumstances and contexts. The use of embodied robots
as models of mental disorders therefore also means that
behavior can be modeled, observed and manipulated sys-
tematically in context, going beyond computational psy-
chiatry approaches that model brain (dys-)functionality in
neural networks or other machine learning algorithms. The
fact that, due to their embodiment, robots can have real
(as opposed to simulated) interactions with the (human-
inhabited) environment is also crucial as it permits to take
into account external triggers related to mental disorders.
The interaction with the environment is important in situa-
tions where according to the conceptual model, the initial
cause, or alternatively the trigger for symptoms, is related
to environmental interactions.
Robot models can complement and help to understand
animal models and their relevance to the understanding
and treatment of human mental disorders in a number of
important ways, as we will see in section 4.
3. Animal Models of Mental Disorders
In order to evaluate the potential of and to consider
how to make the best use of robot models of mental
disorders, we look at animal models in general and in
their application in OC spectrum disorders.
3.1. Development of Animal Models
Van der Staay describes the development of animal
models as an iterative process [6] that starts with selection
of the phenotype to be modeled (e.g., a behavior, or an
internal “endophenotype” such as a hormone imbalance),
and continues until either no refinement of the animal
model is required following testing (accept the model),
or the model is considered inadequate and development is
halted. In practice, the animal model may be continuously
in development throughout its lifetime since it will never
fully represent the target condition. Van der Staay’s pre-
sentation of the development process does not explicitly
mention an underlying theoretical model for the animal
model. The fact that van der Staay’s evaluation criteria
(see section 3.2) allow an animal model to lack construct
validity if it has face validity, seems to agree with the
observation that the aspects to be modeled can include el-
ements from the behavior or “phenotype” (leading to face
validity) and the underlying aspects or “endophenotype”
(leading to concept validity).
3.2. Evaluation
Animal models for human mental disorders are gen-
erally evaluated according to four criteria [6], [9], [10]:
• Predictive validity: Performance in the animal
model predicts performance in the condition being
modeled. For example, the animal model should
successfully discriminate between effective and
ineffective treatments.
• Face validity: Phenomenological similarity be-
tween the animal model and the condition. For
example, the symptoms of the condition are ob-
served in the animal.
• Construct validity: The same physiological, psy-
chological or conceptual constructs are applicable
in the animal model and the condition (homology).
For example, brain lesions in the animal are made
where brain damage is observed in humans.
• Reliability: The outputs of the animal model are
robust and reproducible. For example, they can be
reproduced between laboratories.
Note that the importance and interpretation of the three
validity criteria may vary according to the goals of the an-
imal model. For example, for clinical purposes, predictive
validity would typically be of the highest importance as
it leads to potential treatments.
Construct validity can be interpreted in different ways,
but one aspect is as an assessment of the extent to
which the animal model embeds a conceptual model of
the condition. In this way an animal model with high
construct validity can be used as evidence for (or against)
a conceptual model if it shows high (or low) predictive
and face validity. However, construct validity is also be
seen where there are observations of endophenotypical
correlation (see next section).
3.3. Animal Models of OC Spectrum Disorders
Camilla d’Angelo et al. examined twenty-nine animal
models of OC spectrum disorders according to the above
criteria [11]. In this section we summarize their main
findings.
Many models achieved good face validity, with a
common negative being that the animal behaviors were
relevant to other disorders as well (lack of specificity).
However, the behaviors observed were limited to the com-
pulsive (behavioral) side of the OC spectrum, neglecting
the (cognitive) obsessions. This is a general limitation of
animal models with respect to mental health conditions,
and therefore we discuss it in a separate section (see sec-
tion 3.4). These problems have direct implications for the
elaboration of robot models of OCD and more generally of
mental disorders. From the point of view of researchers
creating robot models, the issues related to the lack of
specificity need to be considered at the design stage: if
our model shows face validity for a targeted condition
(e.g., OCD), what alternative diagnoses (e.g., OCD versus
OCPD versus addiction) might be made based on those
symptoms (e.g., repetitive behavior)? The characteristics
of the model can be shaped so that more information about
the internal endophenotype is available. For example, by
explicitly modeling a particular brain region or receptor
within the system, so that data can be collected from it.
In the above-mentioned study, construct validity was
largely limited to endophenotypical correlations (for ex-
ample, changes in hormone levels or the involvement of
brain regions associated with the OC spectrum) rather
than the embedding of a conceptual model. This may be
due to a limitation in experimenters’ ability to manipulate
biology and thus to build a specific model. However,
it is worth noting that in several cases the methods
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used in creating the model were linked to OC spectrum
endophenotypes (e.g., drugs were chosen with observed
links to OCD) so this could be considered as an implicit
underlying model.
Predictive validity was variable, often unknown, and
largely assessed in terms of drug response (one case
went beyond this since the model suggested the possible
involvement of the immune system, with implications for
human research). This is illustrative of a limitation of
animal models: many psychological interventions are not
easily testable, or only testable in limited ways. For exam-
ple, exposure and response prevention (ERP) therapy used
to treat OCD involves buy-in from the patient: they must
be willing to undergo the exposure and resist responding
(with support from the psychologist or friends), and this
aspect is not possible to reproduce with animals.
In section 4.4 we discuss how robot models of mental
disorders can be evaluated in terms of the same four
validity criteria used for animal models, and how they
complement animal models and permit to overcome the
limitations outlined here. The design recommendations
presented in section 5.1 also take into account these
limitations and propose ways to overcome them when
designing and using robot models of mental disorders in
general, including the OC family.
3.4. Face Validity in Mental Disorders
As mentioned in the previous section when discussing
animal models of the OC family, animal models of mental
disorders tend to show good face validity, but present the
problem of lack of specificity (i.e., the animal behaviors
associated with a specific disorder are relevant to other
disorders as well). Here we examine this problem in
further detail.
The utility of face validity for animal models can be
viewed as problematic when we look at how psychological
symptoms are considered in the clinic. The classic text by
Fish [12] groups symptoms into the following chapters:
• Disorders of Perception (e.g., hallucinations)
• Disorders of Thought (e.g., obsessive thoughts,
delusions) and Speech (e.g., mutism, word deaf-
ness)
• Disorders of Memory (e.g., amnesias, de´ja` vu)
• Disorders of Emotion (e.g., abnormal emotional
reactions)
• Disorders of the Experience of the Self (e.g., loss
of sense of boundary with the environment, sense
of alienation from one’s own actions)
• Disorders of Consciousness (e.g., confusion,
dream-like state)
• Motor Disorders (e.g., tics, stupor, sense of alien-
ation from one’s own actions)
This list highlights the difficulty in using these symptoms
with animal models. While motor disorders such as tics
or stupor can be read in animals, and amnesias can be
probed with learning tasks, other symptoms are difficult
to imagine being recognizable in animals. How could we
recognize a sense of alienation from one’s own actions
in a mouse, or even a primate? This echoes the obser-
vation in section 3.3 that face validity in OCD spectrum
animal models only addressed the compulsions, not the
obsessions.
Taking behavior as a proxy for mental state must
be done with caution even in apparently simple cases:
mutism (equivalently, lack of vocalizations in an animal)
could be caused by many different (physical and) mental
states, that would correspond to quite different diagnoses
in humans. By way of example, we recall the difference
between OCD and OCPD in humans (section 2.1) in
which similar behavioral patterns are not viewed as being
on the same spectrum, in part due to the way they are
perceived internally by the patient.
Neurologically invasive procedures may offer some
insight into these internal aspects of a condition by way
of neurological correlates of mental states or perceptions.
However, they are less ethically acceptable than non-
invasive techniques, especially in animals that are evo-
lutionarily closer to humans. This is an area where robot
models may offer benefit, since the whole “brain” is avail-
able for realtime tracking with little practical difficulty and
without similar ethical issues.
4. Robot Models
4.1. Examples of Robot Models
Work in biologically-inspired cognitive robotics can
help to elucidate cognitive dysfunctions. Embodied cog-
nition and its development has been investigated and mod-
eled in areas such as cognitive and developmental robotics
for decades now, and these fields are sufficiently mature
to undertake a well grounded study of its dysfunctions.
To date, very few robot models specifically of mental
disorders have been developed, with work by Yamashita
and Tani [13] being one of the rare examples. They mod-
eled schizophrenia by first training a robot controlled by a
neural network to move an object in specific ways. After
training the robot, they followed a model of schizophre-
nia as a failure in top-down (prediction) and bottom-up
(perception) interactions, by adding noise to weights con-
necting levels of the hierarchical network, thus introducing
errors. This led to behaviors in robot such as “catalepsy”
(freezing in place) and stereotypical (repetitive) behavior.
Other work in cognitive-affective and developmental
robotics has also modeled more implicitly, or can give
rise to the emergence of mental disorders as dysfunction
of different cognitive-affective cognitive capabilities in
robots, such as schizophrenia stemming from malfunc-
tions of dopaminergic and serotonergic modulation in
neuromodulated robots [14], addiction, impulsivity and
compulsive behavior as dysfunctions of pleasure neuro-
/hormonal modulation of incentive salience in decision
making [15], or the development of anxious behavioral
phenotypes and dysfunctions of attachment to a human
caregiver as a result of poor or negative early sensorimotor
and interaction experiences [16].
4.2. Advantages of Robot Models
One significant advantage of computational models,
including robot models, over animal models is that it
allows precise operationalization and explicit implemen-
tation of an underlying theoretical model. While models
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may be implemented in animals, experimenters may not
always have enough control over the biology to implement
it as precisely as desired (see section 3.3).
In relation to our ability to replicate experiments, while
there are variations between robots, in general these are
more controlled than in animal models where differences
in strain, gender, age, development/rearing conditions and
health may lead to differences in experimental outcomes
affecting reliability. For replicability, source code can be
provided (with robot schematics, if necessary), and care
should also be taken to note hardware and firmware revi-
sion numbers and configuration of the robots. The robots’
“health” may have an effect, for example due to physical
wear-and-tear on components. If possible, unique identi-
fiers of robots should be recorded with the data in order
that they can be identified and re-examined in future—
a possibility not available with animals. Arguably more
significant than replicability is reproducibility [7], and for
this the description of the software is needed, along with
its key theoretical underpinnings (the conceptual model)
so that it can be re-implemented, potentially in a different
robot platform.
Possible environmental confounding factors can also
be better controlled with robots than with animals. For
example, experimenter smell was unexpectedly found to
affect mouse and rat stress responses [17], which may
have affected results. Such effects can be limited in robots
since we have more knowledge of, and control over,
their sensory systems. However, care still needs to be
taken, e.g., to control for variations in temperature, or
lighting when using robots that use infra-red or light-based
sensors.
Compared to animal models, robot models offer some
flexibility in terms of embodiment, which can even be
custom designed. Animal models are limited to existing
organisms, with ethical issues limiting the use of some
animals more than others. An example of where this
may be of use is when the model agent is required to
manipulate objects which may be difficult for animals,
but for which a custom tool can be added to a robot.
Robot models also allow us to test hypothetical phar-
maceutical interventions. For example, they may test sim-
ulated drugs that have a single targeted effect on one
element, when no such chemical has yet been found, or
when known chemicals have undesirable properties such
as side effects or not crossing the blood-brain barrier. Such
simulations could be used in helping to select targets for
drug designers.
4.3. Disadvantages of Robot Models
Although robot models form a complete system
(robot/environment), unlike in animal models we do not
get a complete biological system with its associated com-
plexities. For example, in examining the effects of a drug,
factors such as absorption, the effect of the blood-brain
barrier, and breakdown and excretion are automatically in-
cluded when using animal models—in addition to possible
unanticipated side effects. This is of crucial importance in
predicting clinical effects.
Compared to purely computational models, many
robot models will need to be simplified or use a higher
level of abstraction due to the often reduced computa-
tional power, and the additional computational overheads
related to being a complete agent entertaining complex
sensorimotor interactions with the world. In addition, there
are practical aspects of running robot experiments—e.g.,
keeping batteries charged, working in realtime (sometimes
slower than realtime), physical breakdowns, managing the
environment—that prevent large numbers of experiments
being done for statistical validity.
There may also be limitations in the ability of current
robots to perform many complex tasks, such as the fine
manipulation that can be observed in OCD, for example,
when objects are placed precisely at the “correct” position
to make them symmetrical. This mirrors problems in
animal models, which are limited in what human-like
activities they can perform, although in many cases they
can execute complex tasks, that we cannot yet implement
in robots (we may not even have a good understanding of
how the animals are able to do the task).
4.4. Evaluation of Robot Models
Robot models of mental disorders can be evaluated and
validated along the same four criteria discussed for ani-
mal models, complementing their contributions to cross-
disciplinary and translational research:
• Face validity: phenomenological similarity be-
tween a robot model of a condition, and the
condition in humans (or in other animals) is a
natural consequence of robot models, particularly
in terms of behavior and interaction. As discussed
previously, generating behavior and embodied in-
teraction is the natural thing to do with robots, and
an aspect where robots can best complement and
go beyond computational models. Given a theoret-
ical model of a cognitive-affective capability and
hypotheses about its dysfunctions in humans, the
operationalization of such a model in an embodied
interacting robot will naturally seek to replicate
behavioral phenotypes predicted and observed in
humans in similar contexts. The face validity of
robot models can thus be very high.
• Construct validity: the construct validity of an-
imal models can be considered an issue or re-
garded as unproblematic depending on the theoret-
ical perspective adopted. For example, approaches
grounded in behavioristic psychology will more
naturally accept that results obtained for one
species will apply to other species since the un-
derlying cognitive mechanisms (e.g., conditioned
learning) are postulated to be similar. On the other
hand, the construct validity of animal models will
be more critically questioned by approaches that
give much importance to species-specific features
and differences, such as models grounded in ethol-
ogy. The construct validity of robot models can be
questioned on different grounds. For example, the
fact that robots and biological systems are made of
different matter; or that the models and algorithms
implemented in robots are simplifications of bio-
logical constructs. However, what critics consider
as weaknesses of these models can also be con-
sidered as strengths. The fact that robot models
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are simplifications permits to capture key selected
structural, functional, or dynamics elements for a
focused, rigorous investigation. Different models
of the same phenomenon that approach it at differ-
ent levels of granularity from different theoretical
perspectives can also be implemented, tested, and
compared, permitting to bridge gaps across levels
and conceptual perspectives, which is a crucial is-
sue in cross-disciplinary and translational research.
Interdisciplinary work to elaborate robot models
is of course a must to guarantee the relevance and
construct validity of the model.
• Predictive validity: given a robot model of a
cognitive-affective capability or a condition with
good construct and face validity, predictive validity
stems naturally. In fact, predictive validity is one
of the key methods used in biologically-inspired
robotics to assess models, both qualitatively and
quantitatively. In addition to assessing the accu-
racy of the prediction, robot models can allow
us to understand the mechanisms and processes
underlying the predicted behavior and how both
relate, since it is possible to carry out detailed and
rigorous quantitative measurements and analysis
of the internal architecture of the robot and its
behavior as a function of internal and external
influences (e.g., stimuli) and their interaction dy-
namics (see e.g., [15], [16]).
• Reliability: good robot models should be very ro-
bust and highly reproducible. Since robots operate
in the real world and due to embodiment-related
features such as noise in sensors and actuators, it
is never possible to reproduce exactly the same ex-
perimental conditions (as it would be possible with
computer simulations). However, well designed
controlled experiments permit the reproduction of
similar key relevant conditions (controlled vari-
ables in both the environment and the robot) with
enough accuracy; experiments can be repeated
many times, and accurate statistical/mathematical
analysis guarantees the significance and reliability
of the results. Compared to animal models, robot
models can be considerably more reliable in terms
of controllability, replicability and robustness (see
section 4.2).
5. Building Robot Models
In van der Staay’s description, development of
an animal model starts with either the selection of
(endo)phenotypes [6] or a preliminary hypothesis stage,
followed by the selection of (endo)phenotypes [18]. In
designing a robot model, we caution that it is very easy to
create behaviors (phenotypes). Trivially, specific behaviors
can simply be programmed if the designer wishes, but
aberrant behaviors can also be created by poorly cho-
sen parameters, faulty perception, or programming errors.
Therefore, we will not take the phenotype as a starting
point for robot models.
With a robot, unlike in animal models (see construct
validity in section 3.3), we are free to take as a starting
point a conceptual model, that may be implemented in
the robot either with refinement (for example, if the con-
ceptual model is insufficiently specified) or simplification.
This gives a level of conceptual validity as part of the
design process. However, it is important to note that this
validity is with the conceptual model, not necessarily with
the condition being modeled, indeed the robot model’s
success in generating the phenotype of the condition can
serve as a test of the conceptual model.
5.1. Recommendations
In order to ensure that the potential of robot models for
mental disorders in met, we propose the following initial
list of recommendations for using robots as models for
mental disorders:
1) Start design from a theoretical model (section 5).
2) The model must be capable of creating “good”
phenotypes (“correct behavior”) as well as symp-
tomatic phenotypes (section 5).
3) Design and data collection should take into ac-
count endophenotypes: known endophenotypes
should be accessible, and unobserved endophe-
notypes can be anticipated, especially those pre-
dicted by the conceptual model. In addition, in
order to advance beyond animal models, design
and data collection should consider “internal”
symptoms (sections 3.3, 3.4).
4) Design should consider superficially similar dis-
orders and consider how they might be distin-
guished. Do the chosen phenotypes have suffi-
cient specificity? (sections 3.3, 3.4).
5) To aid reliability, the environment should be con-
trolled, particularly with respect to elements that
are likely to affect the functioning of the robot
(sections 4.2, 4.4).
6) To aid replicability (as opposed to reproducibil-
ity) source code should be stored, along with
details of the robots used and their configuration
(section 4.2).
7) For translational research, predictive validity
must be considered (section 3.2). In particular, the
design should anticipate the integration of pos-
sible treatments. These could be environmental
manipulations (taking advantage of the embodied
aspect of the robot), simulated pharmaceuticals
(see section 4.2), or simulated psychological in-
terventions.
8) Models should differentiate between cure (target-
ing what maintains a disorder) and prevention
(targeting the initial cause of a disorder), bearing
in mind that patients may only present themselves
after suffering for years with a condition.
5.2. Design Process
Based on the above discussion and recommendations,
we propose the following iterative process for designing
a robot model of a mental disorder (figure 1) based on
van der Staay’s process for animal models, and illustrated
with some examples from OCD:
1) Select or create a suitable conceptual model of a
mental disorder (or a small set of models that can
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start
Model selection:
Select conceptual model(s)
Selection stage:
(endo)phenotypes to be modeled
Consensus stage:
find consensus on concepts, definitions, assumptions
Deduction stage:
generate operational definitions of (endo)phenotypes,
model components; simplifications
Build model:
Select/design robot hardware
Build model:
Design robot control software and environment
Select data to be collected Testing stage:experiments
Evaluation stage:
evaluate results of experiments;
expose model to criticism
Remodeling
or refinement
required?
Reconsider
criteria?
yes
Accept the model:
use the model for further studies
no
Induction stage:
refine or correct concepts
based on insight gained
yes
Model is inadequate:
Stop model development
no
Figure 1. Flowchart for the proposed iterative process for designing a robot model of a mental disorder. This closely follows the process described
in [6], [18]. Each stage is elaborated in section 5.1.
be implemented and compared). This will form
the basis of the robot model, and in some cases
ideas about the complementarity of models will
allow multiple conceptual models to be combined
or compared.
For OCD, compulsions can be understood as mal-
adjusted reversal learning, as a problem related
to signal attenuation, or as related to anxiety
[19]. The choice of one or another will lead to
the possibility of modeling different aspects and
symptoms of OCD.
2) Select (endo)phenotypes of interest. This includes
both behavioral phenotypes, internal cognitive
phenotypes, and biological endophenotypes—see
recommendation 3.
For OCD, behaviors (phenotypes) could include
repeatedly checking the same area of the environ-
ment (a “home” or “nest”). Animal models might
usefully serve as inspiration for concrete behav-
iors that the robot can exhibit, as animal models
provide simplified versions of human behavior.
Going beyond these behavioral phenotypes, in a
robot, in which we can examine the internal state,
we can also have the opportunity to consider
cognitive phenotypes such as obsessions, which
are not easily observable in animal models. For
example, this could be the dysfunctionally fre-
quent triggering of a sensorimotor or cognitive
representation associated with a compulsive be-
havior.
3) Consensus stage: find consensus on and refine
concepts, criteria, definitions, assumptions. Care
should be taken that the concepts agree with those
in the psychological literature, and that there is
sufficient specificity for the condition (see sec-
tion 3.3 for the limitation in animal models, and
recommendation 4).
4) Deduction stage: create operational definitions of
the (endo)phenotypes selected, concepts. Some
simplification may be required here, in order to
take into account the limitations of the robot
platform.
For OCD, the checking behavior may be concep-
tually simplified as a repeated visiting behavior.
How an internal aspect such as obsessions can
be defined may depend on the control software
to be used. For example, if the robot is controlled
by a neural network, obsessions may correspond
to repeated activation of a particular area of the
network.
5) Model building: select/create robot hardware (it
must at least be capable of the behaviors). Stan-
dard robot platforms can be used, or increasingly
custom platforms can be designed and shared
through standard controllers and 3D-printing.
For OCD, if the phenotype of interest is visiting
(checking) a particular area, then a simple mo-
bile robot with appropriate sensors and simple
behaviors to navigate its environment is sufficient
(versus, for example, a sophisticated humanoid
robot with complex social communication skills).
6) Model building: design robot control software
(based on the refined theoretical models from
step 3) and environmental features (which should
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match the capabilities of the robot, as in the
example in the previous step).
7) Select data to be collected. This should take into
account recommendation 3: ideally, the literature
should be searched for known and hypothesized
(endo)phenotypes and if an analogue exists in the
model, data can be collected relating to it.
For OCD, in addition to data to quantify the
(endo)phenotypes of interest, data can be col-
lected related to alternative models. For exam-
ple, review of the models for OCD described
by Shafran and outlined in section 2.2 may lead
to collecting data relating to the robot’s internal
appraisal mechanisms, evaluation of danger, or
levels of certainty about relevant aspects of the
environment.
8) Robot model testing: run experiments in the en-
vironment, collect and analyze data. The testing
should also ensure that the model can produce
non-pathological (endo)phenotypes, such as nor-
mal (non-compulsive) checking behavior in the
case of OCD.
9) Model evaluation. The robot model can be eval-
uated with respect to the predictions of the con-
ceptual model (both the underlying one and al-
ternatives), animal models, purely computational
models, and the mental health condition as it
occurs in humans. In addition, predictions of the
robot model can be tested in animal models or
experiments with human patients. See section 4.4.
10) Refine or correct concepts and return to step 2.
This may include modifying the conceptual
model that underlies the robot model, and should
involve collaboration with experts in the associ-
ated mental health condition, since it is the health
condition that is the ultimate target of the model.
6. Conclusion
Robot models of mental disorders have the potential to
add to our knowledge of these mental health conditions,
to make clinical contributions in translational work, and
to complement animal models and purely computation
models, going beyond them in some aspects. However,
in order to achieve this potential, we need to learn from
the extensive literature on animal models, to take seriously
its insights, and to note where its areas of weakness lie, in
order to best complement it. As work towards this goal,
we have proposed an initial set of recommendations, and
an iterative design process based on a process from the
animal model literature.
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